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INTERMEDIATE LOGICS AND THE DE JONGH PROPERTY
DICK DE JONGH, RINEKE VERBRUGGE, AND ALBERT VISSER
Abstract. We prove that all extensions of Heyting Arithmetic with a logic
that has the nite frame property possess the de Jongh property.
Dedicated to Petr H ajek, on the occasion of his 70th Birthday
1. Preface
The three authors of this paper have enjoyed Petr H ajek's acquaintance since
the late eighties, when a lively community interested in the metamathematics of
arithmetic shared ideas and traveled among the beautiful cities of Prague, Moscow,
Amsterdam, Utrecht, Siena, Oxford and Manchester. At that time, Petr H ajek and
Pavel Pudl ak were writing their landmark book Metamathematics of First-Order
Arithmetic [HP91], which Petr H ajek tried out on a small group of eager graduate
students in Siena in the months of February and March 1989.
Since then, Petr H ajek has been a role model to us in many ways. First of all, we
have always been impressed by Petr's meticulous and clear use of correct notation,
witness all his dierent types of dots and corners, for example in the Tarskian
`snowing'-snowing lemmas [HP91]. But also as a human being, Petr has been a
role model by his example of living in truth, even in averse circumstances [Hav89].
The tragic story of the Logic Colloquium 1980, which was planned to be held in
Prague and of which Petr H ajek was the driving force, springs to mind [DvDLS82].
Finally, we were moved by Petr's open-mindedness when coming to terms with a
situation that turned out to look disconcertingly unlike the `standard model'
1.
Therefore, in this paper, we would like to pay homage to Petr H ajek. Unfor-
tunately, we cannot hope to emulate his correct use of dots and corners. Instead,
we do our best to provide some pleasing non-standard models and non-classical
arithmetics.
2. Introduction
Consider a theory T in constructive predicate logic. A propositional formula ' is
T-valid i, for all substitutions  of formulas of the language of T for propositional
variables, we have T ` ('). The set of T-valid formulas is the propositional logic
of T. We will call this logic T. The de Jongh property for T is the statement
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that the propositional logic T of T is precisely Intuitionistic Propositional Logic,
in other words, T = IPC.
The original theorem of de Jongh was that Heyting's Arithmetic HA has the de
Jongh property. In the past many generalizations have been proved; we will give
an enumeration below. In these generalizations the objective was mostly to prove
(or in rare cases disprove) the de Jongh property for extensions of HA with some
properties like e.g. Church's Thesis. In this paper we will go in a dierent direction.
The idea is to strengthen the logic from the intuitionistic logic to an intermediate
one. Intermediate logics are all those logics of strength between intuitionistic and
classical logics. Dene the de Jongh property for T with respect to an intermediate
logic  as the statement that T = . Our conjecture is the following.
Conjecture 2.1. Let HA() be the result of extending HA with  for all formu-
las.Then HA() = .
In this paper we will prove this conjecture for logics  with the Finite Frame
Property, namely,
there exists a class of nite frames F such that  is precisely the
logic valid on all models on frames in F. For this class F we then
have:
 = f' j F j= 'g = f' j for all M on F;M j= 'g
For intermediate logics, as for normal modal logics, the nite frame property 
is in fact equivalent to the ostensibly weaker nite model property (FMP), which
expresses that there is a class of nite models M such that  is precisely the logic
valid on all models in M. (See section 4 for more background.)
For logics  with the nite frame property, indeed HA() has the de Jongh prop-
erty with respect to . As we will discuss in the conclusion (section 7), there seems
to be little chance of generalizing the methods of this paper to a more extensive
class of intermediate logics.
In our proof we will only employ substitutions of 0
2-sentences. From this it fol-
lows by quite general reasoning, that, assuming that our class of frames is recursive,
we have a uniform version of the de Jongh property. This means that, for  with
the nite frame property, there is a single substitution ? such that HA() ` ?(')
i  ` '. Or, in a dierent formulation, there is an embedding of the Lindenbaum
Heyting algebra of  into the Lindenbaum Heyting algebra of HA().
3. A Brief History of de Jongh's Theorem
The following brief overview of the history of de Jongh's Theorem for proposi-
tional logic is adapted from [Vis99].
1969: Dick de Jongh proves in an unpublished paper his original theorem that
HA = IPC. He uses substitutions of formulas of a complicated form, namely
8x((x)_:(x)) with  almost negative. As a reminder, a formula is almost
negative if it does not contain _, and 9 only in front of an equation between
terms (see [Tro73]). In fact he proves a much stronger result, namely that
the logic of relative interpretations in HA is Intuitionistic Predicate Logic.
See the extended abstract [Jon70]. de Jongh's argument uses an ingenious
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1973: Harvey Friedman in his paper [Fri73] gives another proof of de Jongh's
theorem for HA. He provides a single substitution  mapping the propo-
sitional variables to 0
2-sentences such that HA ` (') , IPC ` '. Thus,
Friedman shows that IPC is uniformly complete for 0
2-substitutions in HA.
Friedman employs slash-theoretic methods as introduced by Kleene [Kle62].
1973: Craig Smory nski strengthens and extends de Jongh's work in a number
of respects in his very readable paper [Smo73]. To state his results we need a
few denitions. We write D(1) for the set of disjunctions of 0
1-sentences,
Prop(1) for propositional combinations of 0
1-sentences. Let us remind the
reader of some relevant principles (see [Tro73] for extensive discussions).
MP is Markov's Principle MP:
8x(A _ :A) ^ ::9xA ! 9xA:
RFNHA is the formalized uniform reection principle for HA, where 8yAy is
closed:
ProofHA(x;pAyq) ! Ay
TI() is the transnite induction scheme for a primitive recursive well-
ordering :
8x((8y  x)Ay ! Ax) ! 8yAy:
We have de Jongh's Theorem for the following theories T:
HA, HA+RFN(HA), HA+TI(), and HA+MP.
For the rst three theories we can take the range of our substitutions either
0
1 or D(1). For HA+MP we can take the range of our substitutions
Prop(1). Smory nski uses Kripke models in combination with the G odel-
Rosser-Mostowski-Kripke-Myhill theorem to prove his results.
1975: Daniel Leivant in his PhD Thesis [Lei79] shows that the predicate logic
of interpretations of predicate logic in HA is precisely intuitionistic predicate
logic. Leivant's method is proof-theoretical. In fact Leivant shows that one
can use as interpretation a xed sequence of 0
2-predicates. Leivant's results
yield another proof of Friedman's results described above.
1976: de Jongh and Smory nski in their paper [JS76] show de Jongh's Theorem
for HAS. They also show uniform completeness for HAS with respect to a
substitution with range among the 0
2-sentences.
1981: Yu.V. Gavrilenko in [Gav81] proves de Jongh's Theorem for HA+ECT0,
i.e., the theory of provable realizability over HA. The principle ECT0 is
Extended Church's Thesis (see [Tro73]):
8x(A ! 9yBy) ! 9u8x(A ! 9v(Tuxv ^ B(Uv)));
where A is almost negative and u does not occur free in A and B and v not
in B. In the formula ECT0 above, T stands for Kleene's T-predicate and U
for the corresponding result-extracting function [Kle43]. Gavrilenko proves
this result as a corollary of the similar result of Smory nski for HA.
1981: As a reminder, the principle DNS stands for `double negation shift'
(see [Tro73]):
8x::Ax ! ::8xAx
Albert Visser in his Ph.D. thesis [Vis81] provides an alternative proof of
de Jongh's theorem for HA, HA+DNS, and HA+ECT0 for 0
1-substitutions
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L ob's logic for substitutions in PA [Sol76]. In fact, his proof extends to the
same theories extended with appropriate reection principles or transnite
induction over primitive recursive well-orderings.
1985: In his [Vis85], Albert Visser provides an alternative proof of de Jongh's
uniform completeness theorem employing a single 0
1-substitution. The
proof is veriable in HA+con(HA). Here, con(HA) formalizes the consistency
of Heyting Arithmetic. Note that de Jongh's theorem implies con(HA), so
the result is, in a sense, optimal. Visser's proof uses the NNIL-algorithm, an
algorithm that is used to characterize the admissible rules for 0
1-substitutions.
See also [Vis02].
1991: Jaap van Oosten in his paper [Oos91b] provides a more perspicuous
version of de Jongh's semantical proof of de Jongh's theorem for (non-
relativized) interpretations of predicate logic. Van Oosten uses Beth models
and realizability. See also [Oos91a].
1996: Using the methods developed by Visser in [Vis82] and by de Jongh
and Visser in [JV96], one can prove uniform completeness with respect to
0
1-substitutions for HA+ECT0, HA+ECT0+RFN(HA+ECT0), and
HA+TI()+ECT0.
It is well known that the de Jongh property does not hold for HA + MP + ECT0.
Consider the formulas  and , which are dened as follows.
  := (:p _ :q),
  := [(:: ! ) ! ( _ :)] ! (:: _ :)
Clearly,  is not provable in IPC. We use r for Kleene realizability. In his classical
paper [Ros53], G.F. Rose showed that: 9e 82subHA N j= er(). Here subHA is the
set of substitutions from the propositional variables to sentences of the arithmetical
language. Thus, Rose refuted a conjecture of Kleene that a propositional formula
is IPC-provable if all its arithmetical instances are (truly and classically) realizable.
Note the remarkable fact that one and the same realizer realizes all instances!
Inspecting the proof, one sees that only a small part of classical logic is involved in
the verication of realizability: Markov's Principle. See David McCarthy's paper
[McC91] for a detailed analysis. Thus we obtain:
9e 82subHA HA + MP ` er():
Hence, a fortiori,  2 HA+MP+ECT0. See [Pli09] for an interesting recent survey of
propositional realizability logic.
4. Intermediate Logics and the Finite Model Property
Intermediate logics (also called superintuitionistic logics) are the logics between
IPC and CPC, classical propositional logic, i.e. the sets of of formulas closed under
IPC-deduction and uniform substitution. Most anything one needs to know about
these logics can be found in [CZ97]. We will enumerate the best known of these
logics and mention a few basic facts, mainly concerning the nite model property.
The well-known theorem for normal modal logics that the nite frame property and
the nite model property for a model logic L coincide (see e.g. [BdRV02]), applies
to intermediate logics as well [CZ97]. This means that every sentence not provable
from the logic cannot only be refuted in a nite model of the logic, it can also be
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that a logic has the nite model property (FMP) if there is a class of nite frames
for which it is complete. As in the case of modal logics, not all intermediate logics
are complete with respect to a class of frames, and not all those which are complete
for such a class have the FMP. But all except one of the well-known intermediate
logics which we will now discuss are known to be complete with respect to a class
of nite frames.
LC, Dummett's logic, axiomatized by, e.g. (' !  ) _ (  ! '), is complete with
respect to the nite linear frames.
KC, Jankov's logic (also called the logic of weak decidability, whereas real intu-
itionists might prefer, if anything, the logic of testability), axiomatized by :'_::',
is complete with respect to the nite frames with a unique endpoint.
KP, the logic of Kreisel and Putnam, axiomatized by
(:' !   _ ) ! (:' !  ) _ (:' ! ):
It is complete with respect to the nite partial orderings satisfying the property:
For each u and each set X of points succeeding u, there exists a v accessible from
u such that all points of X are accessible from v and every endpoint above v is also
above some point from X. KP was the rst logic shown to have the disjunction
property: If ` ' _  , then ` ' or `  , where ` stands for provability in the given
logic (here KP) [KP57].
Tn, the Gabbay-deJongh logics, which are complete with respect to the nite trees
which have splittings of exactly n, i.e. each node has exactly n immediate successors.
Tn is axiomatized by
^
kn+1
(('k !
_
j6=k
'j) !
_
j6=k
'j) !
_
kn+1
'k
T1 coincides with LC. Tn-frames for n>1 do not have a rst order denition. More-
over, Tnfor n>1 is not canonical([CZ97]). However, it is rst-order denable on
nite frames: it is characterized by the condition that every point has at most n
immediate successors. Finally,Tn for n>1 has the disjunction property [dJG74].
BDn, the depth n logics are complete with respect to the nite partial orderings
(but also to the trees, or to the splitting trees) of depth n. BD1 is classical logic,
and is axiomatized by Peirce's Law, ((' !  ) ! ') ! '. An axiomatization of
BDn for n>1 is obtained by iteratedly substituting Peirce's Law into itself, e.g.
BD2 is axiomatized by ((' ! (((  ! ) !  ) !  )) ! ') ! '.
Sc, Scott's logic, axiomatized by ((::' ! ') ! (' _ :')) ! :' _ ::'. It
is complete with respect to the nite partial orderings satisfying the property: In
each generated subframe all the endpoints are connected by an R;R 1-chain con-
taining only points of depth 0 or 1 (or equivalently the nite frames which do not
have a p-morphism onto the asymmetric four-element tree of depth 3). This is not
equivalent to a rst-order denition. Like Tn and KP, Scott's logic also has the
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ML, Medvedev's logic of nite problems [Med66] has the nite frame prop-
erty (it is complete with respect to the nite boolean algebras without their top
element), but it has no known axiomatization and is not known to be decidable. It
contains Scott's logic and KP and is contained in Jankov's logic. It is not nitely
axiomatizable and its innite axiom systems will need an innity of atoms [MSS79].
ML coincides with the set of formulas all whose essentially negative substitution in-
stances are provable in KP, or stated in another form, it is the logic of the valid
schemata obtained by adding ::p ! p for atoms only to KP (due to [Lev69], see
also [Cia09]).
The Propositional Logic of Realizability. Plisko [Pli09] discusses several vari-
ants out of which we choose the logic of the eectively realizable formulas, although
for most purposes it makes little dierence. The logic has no known axiomatization,
it is not known whether it has the nite model property or is decidable. It does
have the disjunction property. From our earlier remarks it follows that it contains
Scott's logic with :  _ : substituted for the sole variable in Scott's axiom. Just
like ML, the Propositional Logic of Realizability is contained in KC, but it has been
shown to neither contain nor be contained in ML.
All logics using only !;^;: in their axioms have the nite model property, but
none but IPC itself have the disjunction property (see [CZ97]). The same is true for
logics with axioms using only NNIL-formulas (No Nesting of Implications on the
Left); in fact, these logics are the same as the ones using only ! (see [Yan08]).
5. Arithmetics and Finite Frames
In this section, we prove our main result. We follow Smory nski's classical paper
[Smo73]. In that paper Smory nski gives two proofs. We will use the second more
complicated one, which is more exible for applications. But rst we will sketch
in a few lines the rst proof which gives us a partial result, and indicate why it
does not generalize. The idea (of both proofs) is, given a propositional Kripke-
model, to construct a Kripke model for HA on the same frame, and then to exhibit
arithmetical sentences with exactly the same forcing behavior as the propositional
variables on the propositional model.
First, one should realize that any node k in a model K is attached to a classical
structure Mk (not necessarily a model of HA [Bus93]). The simple proof now starts
with the basic lemma:
Lemma 5.1. Given a (non-rooted) model of HA (or equivalently a set of models
for HA), one can obtain a new model of HA by equipping this non-rooted model with
a root to which the standard model of the natural numbers is attached.
Proof. Assume K, K0, r as in the statement of the lemma. Assume also that
r  A(0) ^ 8x(A(x) ! A(x + 1)). It is sucient to show that r  8xA(x),
since the K-part of the model already satises (internal) induction. We have that
r  A(0) ^ (A(n) ! A(n + 1)) for each natural number n. This enables us, by
applying external induction, to conclude that the new root forces A(n) for each n,
from which r 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Figure 1. Scheme of lemma 5.1: A new model of HA is con-
structed by equipping a set of models of HA with a new root, and
attaching the standard model ! to it.
The simple proof now continues using the fact that IPC is complete with respect
to the nite trees that are everywhere splitting (each node has at least two imme-
diate successors). One builds a propositional Kripke-model on the same tree by
starting with non-standard models for PA (and thus for HA!) on the endpoints, and
attaching the standard model to each of the other nodes. By the basic lemma 5.1,
using induction on the depth of the nodes, this is a model of HA.
The non-standard models at the endpoints are chosen to be incomparable in the
following sense: each of them has its own 0
1-sentence, which, in PA, contradicts
all the others. Then, because one has a nite everywhere splitting tree, each node
is completely determined by the endpoints which are accessible from it. This is
sucient to create for each node a sentence true on exactly that node (and its suc-
cessors). Finally, disjunctions of those sentences will characterize arbitrary upward
closed subsets of the model, in particular those determined by the valuations of the
propositional variables in the propositional model.
To those intermediate logics that are complete with respect to a set of nite
splitting trees, this method will immediately apply. The point is that we do not
only get a model of HA but, because of the form of the frame, also of . This is
immediately clear for '(1;:::;n) if '(p1;:::;pn) is a member of  and 1;:::n
are arithmetic sentences with constants for the elements of the appropriate domains
of the models. If in such a case 1;:::n have free variables, then the truth value
of the universally quantied version of '(1;:::;n) depends only on the value of
sentences arising by substitution in '(p1;:::;pn), and, since we declared these to be
true already, the universally quantied forms have to be true as well. In particular,
one obtains in this manner the de Jongh property for HA with respect to the logics
Tn (for n>1) and BDn, but not for KC, KP, and ML. Also not for T1 =LC, because
linear frames do not split everywhere.
Especially, the need to characterize each node exactly by the endpoints accessible
from it seems essential in this setup of the proof. So, for the general case we will
need a dierent way to proceed. One basic idea remains the same. We want to 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root to a number of models. Smory nski's second method does this in a much more
sophisticated manner than the rst, and with this method one can under certain
strict conditions have a root with a non-standard model attached to it. To set the
stage, we need a sequence of lemmas. We start with a few well-known lemmas on
Kripke models of HA. For denitions of forcing in such Kripke models, see [Smo73]
and [TvD88].
Lemma 5.2. Suppose K is a Kripke model of HA. Let A~ x be a 0
1-formula. Then,
for any node k and any ~ d in Dk, we have k  A~ d i Mk j= A~ d.
Proof. We rst prove, by induction on the complexity of A, that, for any 0
0-formula
A~ x, and any node k and any ~ d in Dk, we have k  A~ d i Mk j= A~ d. The proof
uses the fact that HA proves the decidability of 0
1-formulas. We treat the case of
restricted universal quantication.
Suppose we have the desired property for By~ x in 0
0. If k  8y <eBy~ d, then
evidently, for all d0 <Mk e, k  Bd0~ d. Hence, by the Induction Hypothesis, for all
d0 <Mk e, Mk j= Bd0~ d. Hence, Mk j= 8y <e By~ d.
Conversely, suppose (a) Mk j= 8y <eBy~ d. In order to derive a contradiction,
suppose (b) k  9y <e:By~ d. It follows by the Induction Hypothesis and writing
out the negation and restricted existential quantication, that Mk j= 9y <e:By~ d.
Contradicting (a). So, canceling (b), we conclude k 1 9y<x:By~ d. Then, by decid-
ability, k  :9y <e:By~ d. So, by intuitionistic predicate logic, k  8y<e::By~ d.
By decidability again, k  8y <eBy~ d.
The step from 0
0 to 0
1 is easy. 2
The following lemma is due to Wim Ruitenburg.
Lemma 5.3. Let K be a model of HA. Let A~ x be a 0
2-formula. Then, for any node
k and for any ~ d in Dk, we have: k  A~ d i, for all k0  k, Mk0 j= A~ d.
Proof. Suppose A~ x is 8~ y S~ y~ x, where S is 0
1. We have:
k  8~ y S~ y~ d , 8k0k8~ e2Dk0 k0S~ e~ d
, 8k0k8~ e2Dk0 Mk0j=S~ e~ d
, 8k0k Mk0j=8~ y S~ y~ d
This gives us the desired property. 2
Next, we need some basic insights from the theory of interpretations.
Lemma 5.4. Let T be any RE theory. Then Q + con(T) interprets T.
Here Q is Robinson's Arithmetic, a very weak arithmetical theory introduced by
Tarski, Mostowski and Robinson in their book [TMR53].
This is a general version of a fundamental theorem due to Hilbert & Bernays,
which was worked out by Wang. The proof was simplied by Feferman. The
methods that lead to the general version are due to among others Solovay, Friedman,
and Pudl ak. See [Vis09], for context, explanation and references. A very crude
explanation of the result is as follows. The Model Existence Lemma tells us that,
if a theory T is consistent, there is a model N of T. A moment's reection shows
that the construction of this model, via the Henkin construction, is syntactical in
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the consistency statement of T we can construct an interpretation of T. Here
the heuristic is that interpretations are something like uniformly dened internal
models.
Thus, inside any model M of Q + con(T) we can construct a model M0 of T.
Moreover, if M is a model of PA, and if T is an arithmetical theory extending Q,
then we can easily prove, using an argument that is essentially due to Dedekind,
that M0 is an end-extension of M modulo a denable embedding. The idea is that
inside M we can dene the obvious function that maps the numbers of the theory
into the numbers of the internal model M0 by recursion. We can prove by induction
that the numbers of M are mapped to an initial segment of M0. We formulate this
in a lemma. For precise discussions of this and similar lemmas, see [HP91].
Lemma 5.5. Suppose T is an arithmetical theory extending Q. Then every model
M of PA+con(T) contains an internally denable end-extension (modulo a den-
able embedding) satisfying T.
Finally, we formulate Smory nski's fundamental lemma. Consider a non-rooted
Kripke model K of HA and a model M of PA. Suppose K is denable in M. This
means that the set of nodes K of K is denable, that the ordering on the nodes is
denable, that there is a formula (k;d) giving the domain elements of the node k,
and that there are arithmetical formulas AP(k; ~ d) representing k  P ~ d. Moreover,
we ask that M veries basic properties like the fact that the relation between the
nodes is a partial ordering. We have:
Lemma 5.6. There is a denable embedding of M as an initial segment of the
model associated with each node of K. This embedding is unique in the strong sense
that there can be only one denable embedding that commutes with 0 and successor.
Thus we can form a rooted model K+ by adding M as a new root to K. We have:
M+ is a model of HA.
The proof of this result is in Smory nski's classical paper [Smo73]. The idea is a
simple extension of the idea of the basic lemma 5.1. Given a nonrooted model of
HA, we cannot just add an arbitrary non-standard model as the root, since such a
model does have induction for its own language but not for the enriched language in
which we can also talk about K. However, if K is internally denable this problem
disappears and we can add the non-standard model as a root. One could say that
the non-standard model internally thinks it is standard and that as soon as it can
talk about K the earlier external argument can be internalized.
We are now ready for the main construction, which diverges from Smory nski's
proof [Smo73].
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that  is the logic of a given class of nite frames F. Let
HA() be the result of extending HA with  for all formulas. Then
HA() = ;
i.e. the propositional logic of HA() is . Our result works both when we consider
logics of substitutions of formulas and when we consider the logics of substitutions
of sentences.
Proof. Let  be the logic of a given class of nite frames F. Suppose  0 '. There
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be . We can arrange it so that the nodes of K are 0, ..., n 1 and, if i  j, then
i  j. We dene:
 incon
0(PA) := ?, incon
k+1(PA) := provPA (incon
k(PA)),
 Ck := :incon
k(PA) ^ incon
k+1(PA),
 C0(x) := incon(PA),
 Ck+1(x) := :proofPA(x;incon
k(PA)) ^ incon
k+2(PA).
We note that the Ci are mutually exclusive. We dene Ti, for 0  i < n, by
Ti := PA+Cn i. By L ob's Theorem and 0
1-soundness, each of the Ti is consistent.
Moreover, again by L ob's Theorem, for i < n   1, we have Ti ` con(Ti+1). Let
N0 be any model of T0. By Lemma 5.4, we can construct an internal model, say
N1 of T1, in N0. The model N1 will be an end-extension of N0. We iterate this
construction, obtaining an internal model Ni+1 of Ti+1 in Ni. Since `being an
iternal model of' and `being an end-extension of' are transitive relations, we nd
that if i  j  n   1, then Nj is an internally dened end-extension of Ni.
We now construct a Kripke model S by making Mk the model associated to the
node k and taking over the ordering of K. By Smory nski's Lemma 5.6, we nd that
S is a model of HA. Since the frame of our model is in F, we see that S satises
HA().
Consider any proposition p in K. We want to nd an arithmetical formula (p)
such that, for all k < n, S;k  (p) i K;k  p. A rst choice to consider would
be (p) :=
W
K;kp Ck . However, it is easy to see this won't wash. Consider,
for example, i  j and suppose S;i  (p). Then S;i  Cm, for some m with
K;m  p. It follows that Ni j= Cm, and hence that m = i. By persistence, we nd
that S;j  Ci, but then Nj j= Ci. A contradiction.
So this does not work. In the light of Ruitenburg's lemma 5.3, we can diagnose
the problem as follows: the sentence (p) is not constructively equivalent to a
0
2-sentence or some other kind of sentence that gives us a transfer from classical
satisfaction and constructive forcing. However, our (p) is classically equivalent
to a 0
2-sentence, and therein lies the simple solution. Suppose fk j K;k  pg =
fk0;:::;km 1g. We dene:
 ?(p) := 8x0;:::xm 1 (Ck0(x0) _ ::: _ Ckm 1(xm 1)).
It is easy to see that constructively ?(p) is equivalent to a 0
2-sentence and that
classically ?(p) is equivalent to (p).
By Ruitenburg's Lemma 5.3, we nd:
S;i  ?(p) , K;i  p:
Hence, by induction, we nd that, for any  :
S;i  ?( ) , K;i   :
So, S;0 1 ?('). 2
Remark 5.2. A remarkable aspect of the above proof is that, where Smory nski
used Rosser-style self-reference, it only employs G odelean self-reference |since it
uses L ob's Theorem.
Remark 5.3. We note that we can employ a xed series of models in our main
argument that can be chosen independently of the nite frames. This uses an
argument originally due to Harvey Friedman [Fri78]. We de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of the Fixed Point Lemma a formula A(x) such that:
PA ` 8x (A(x) $ (con(PA + A(x + 1)) _ 9yx proofPA(y;:A(0)))):
Let Ti := PA+A(i)+incon(PA+A(i)). Let Ci := con(Ti+1)^incon(Ti). We easily
see that the Ti are consistent and that Ti is equivalent to PA+Ci. Moreover, the Ci
are incompatible. We note that, by L ob's Theorem, Ti ` con(Ti+1). We now start
with a model N0 of T0 in which we construct an internally denable end-extension
N1 that is a model of T1, etc. Thus we obtain a sequence of models Ni, where each
next model is a denable end-extension of the previous one. Moreover, Ni j= Ci.
Can we extend the above proof to other arithmetical theories besides HA as basis?
We note that we can extend it to weaker theories like i-I1, the intuitionistic version
of I1, since the construction of an end-extension from a consistency statement
already works in the classical theory I1 [HP91]. Secondly, the proof also works
for stronger theories like HA plus uniform reection, or HA extended with an RE
set of negations that are 0
2-conservative over PA.
We have one somewhat more interesting extension of our result, for intermediate
logics with what we will call the endpoint replacement property:
Denition 5.4. Consider an intermediate logic .
(1) Let F be a class of frames for the logic. We say that  has the endpoint
replacement property with respect to F if the following holds. Take any F
in F, a set of endpoints fui ji 2 Ig of F, and a set fMi ji 2 Ig of (possibly
innite) models of  with roots fri ji 2 Ig. Let G be the frame that is the
result of replacing the endpoints fui ji 2 Ig by the frames of fMi ji 2 Ig.
Then any model M on G which is such that its submodels generated by
fri ji 2 Ig are exactly the fMi ji 2 Ig will validate .
(2)  has the endpoint replacement property if  has the endpoint replacement
property with respect to its class of frames.
Of the logics we mentioned, the following have the endpoint replacement prop-
erty: IPC, KC, LC, and Tn. The logics KP, Sc, ML, and BDn do not have the
property with respect to a class of frames for which they are complete. On the
negative side: for KP and Sc this is obvious from the fact that the simple 3-element
fork which is a frame for both is no longer a frame for either when attached to an
endpoint of itself. On the positive side, we will just show the most complicated
case: the Tn.
Proposition 5.5. Tn has the endpoint replacement property.
Proof. Let F be a frame for Tn, let fui ji 2 Ig be a set of endpoints of F, and let
fMi ji 2 Ig be a set of models of Tn with roots fri ji 2 Ig. Let M be a model on
the frame G that is the result of replacing the endpoints fui ji 2 Ig by the frames of
fMi ji 2 Ig such that the models generated by the ri are exactly the Mi. We have
to show that the assumption that Tn('1;:::;'n+1) is falsied in M will lead to a
contradiction. We can then assume without loss of generality that the root satises
the antecedent of Tn for '1;:::;'n+1 and falsies each of '1;:::;'n+1. Let us
dene N as the set of nodes in M that falsify each of '1;:::;'n+1. This will be
a downward closed set containing the root, falsifying Tn('1;:::;'n+1) everywhere.12 DICK DE JONGH, RINEKE VERBRUGGE, AND ALBERT VISSER
Since for each k  n + 1,
W
j6=k 'j is falsied at each v 2 N, also 'k !
W
j6=k 'j is
false at v for some k  n+1. This means that for each v 2 N, there is a k  n+1
and a wk with v  wk such that wk makes 'k true but no 'j for j 6= k. Note that
such nodes wk and wj for dierent k and j are always incomparable. Note also that
x  Tn i x 2 N.
Let us rst consider the case that one of the ri is in N. That is impossible, since
then ri 6 Tn('1;:::;'n+1) whereas the model Mi is supposed to be a model for
Tn. The second possibility is that none of the ri are in N. Note that then, if Mi
contains any wk-node as described above, its root ri will have to be a wk-node, and
there cannot be wj-nodes for any j 6= k in Mi. If we now restore the endpoints
fui ji 2 Ig in M in place of the models fMi ji 2 Ig and dene
V 0(pm) = fw 2 F   fuiji 2 Igjw  'mg [ fuijri  'mg;
then it is obvious that for this new valuation, for each v 2 N (and in particular for
the root of F), v 60 Tn(p1;:::;pn+1), since one of the pk !
W
j6=k pj will be falsied
at the appropriate wk.Thus, the resulting model will falsify Tn(p1;:::;pn+1). This
is again a contradiction, because F is a frame for Tn. 2
Theorem 5.6. Suppose that  has both the nite model property and the endpoint
replacement property with respect to a class F of nite frames. Suppose that U is a
consistent extension of HA() with an RE set of negations N. Then U has the de
Jongh property for .
Before we turn to the proof of our theorem, we remind the reader of some basic facts
concerning Rosser sentences. Let V be any consistent RE extension of i-EA, the
intuitionistic version of Elementary Arithmetic. Using Craig's trick, we can arrange
that the axiom set of V is given by an elementary predicate . This predicate can
be taken to be a 0
1(i-EA)-formula. This means that both x and :x are i-EA-
provably equivalent to a 0
1-formula and that x is i-EA-provably decidable. Using
this predicate, we can nd a reasonable arithmetization proofV , the proof-predicate
for V , such that proofV (x;y) is 0
1(i-EA). Let provV (x) be 9y proofV (y;x).
Consider formulas A and B. Suppose A = 9xA0x and B = 9y B0y. We dene:
 A  B :$ 9x(A0x ^ 8y<x:B0y),
 A < B :$ 9x(A0x ^ 8yx:B0y),
 (A < B)? :$ B  A,
 (A  B)? :$ B < A.
Using G odel's Fixed Point Lemma, we can nd a Rosser sentence R for V such that
i-EA ` R $ provV (:R)  provV (R). We clearly have i-EA ` :(R ^ R?). Using
Rosser's argument, we can show that both V + R and V + :R are consistent. We
note that both R and R? can be rewritten over i-EA plus 0
1-collection to the strict
0
1 form. Since we work in extensions of HA, we may assume that R and R? are
0
1.
We turn to the proof of theorem 5.6.
Proof. Let  and U be as required for theorem 5.6. Consider any ' such that  0 '.
Let K be a counter-model in F. Suppose the non-endpoints of K are a0;:::;an 1
and that we have chosen our enumeration in such a way that i  j implies ai  aj.
We repeat our construction from the proof of theorem 5.1 of a sequence of modelsINTERMEDIATE LOGICS AND THE DE JONGH PROPERTY 13
with Ni for 0;:::;n   1, with the modication that we take as our base theory
W := PA + con(U). So Nn 1 will satisfy con(U) and incon(PA + con(U)).
We enumerate the endpoints as b0;:::;br 1. We construct a sequence of 0
1-
sentences S0;:::;Sr 1, with the following properties, for i < j  r   1:
W ` con(U + Si) and U ` :(Si ^ Sj):
The easiest way to construct such a sequence is by induction on r. If r = 1, we
take S0 := >. Suppose we have constructed S0
0;:::S0
s 1 with the desired properties.
Let R and R? be the pair consisting of the 0
1 Rosser sentence for U + S0
s 1
and its 0
1 opposite. We take Si := S0
i, for i < r   1, Sr 1 := (S0
r 1 ^ R), and
Sr := (S0
r 1 ^ R?). We now construct in Nn 1 inner Kripke models of U + Si.
The construction is analogous to the classical case. It is essential that the base
theory in which we do the construction is classical! See Appendix A of [Vis98] for
a description of how to do an internal Kripke model construction. This gives us
models Mj of U + Sj, internally denable in each Ni.
We build a Kripke model for arithmetic by associating Ni with ai and Mj with
bj. This will be a model of HA+N by the internal version of Smory nski's Lemma 5.6,
noting that the additional negations in N are always downwards preserved. It will
be a model of  by the endpoint replacement property. We associate to each
propositional atom p in K the sentence:
Ep :=
_
aip
(Ci ^ con(U)) _
_
bjp
Sj:
As before in the proof of theorem 5.1, we transform Ep to a classically equivalent 0
2-
sentence, say E+
p . Let  be the substitution p 7! E+
p . By Ruitenburg's Lemma 5.3,
we nd that our new model does not force ('). 2
So, for example, for  = IPC;LC;KC;Tn, we do have the de Jongh property
for HA() plus the negation of the sentence expressing the Primitive Recursive
Markov's Principle, and for HA() plus the negation of the sentence expressing the
decidability of the Halting Problem. (See [Tro73] for denitions of these properties.)
6. A Uniformization Result
In this section we show how to prove uniformization using recursion-theoretic
arguments. This style of result is originally due to Franco Montagna [Mon79] and,
independently, Albert Visser [Vis81].
Theorem 6.1. Consider any theory T with elementary axiom set and any inter-
pretation N, such that N interprets i-EA, the constructive version of EA (which is
also known as I0 + exp), in T. Let Ai be an elementary decidable sequence of
sentences in the language of T.
Suppose, for every i, T 0 Ai. Then there is a 0
1-formula R(x) such that:
a. i-EA ` (R(x) ^ R(y)) ! x = y,
b. for any i, T 0 RN(i) ! Ai.
Proof. Let R(x) be such that:
i-EA ` R(x) $ 9p (proofT(p;RN(x) ! Ax) ^
8qp8yq :proofT(q;RN(y) ! Ay))):14 DICK DE JONGH, RINEKE VERBRUGGE, AND ALBERT VISSER
We work with the reasonable assumption that the code of the numeral of y is larger
than y, that the code of a formula in which a numeral occurs is larger than the code
of that numeral, and that the code of a proof is larger than the code of any formula
occurring in it. Also we assume that proofs have single conclusions. (See [HP91]
for discussions of such reasonable assumptions.)
We verify the uniqueness clause (a). Reason in i-EA. Suppose R(x) and R(y) with
witnesses p and q, respectively. In case p = q, we are done. Suppose q < p. From
R(x), we have: 8y0q :proofT(q;RN(y0) ! Ay0). Since, by our assumptions on
coding, we must have y < q, we nd :proofT(q;RN(y) ! Ay). This contradicts
R(y).
We verify (b). Suppose, in order to derive a contradiction, that T ` RN(i) ! Ai.
Let  be a proof that witnesses this fact. Via a nite search among proofs with
G odel number smaller or equal to the G odel number of , we may obtain the T-
proof  with smallest G odel number with a conclusion of the form RN(j) ! Aj.
Say we have:  : T ` RN(i) ! Ai. By the denition of R, it follows that R(i)
is true. So, by 0
1-completeness, T ` RN(i). Hence, T ` Ai, contradicting the
assumption. We may conclude that Ti 0 R(i) ! Ai. 2
Let  be any intermediate logic with the nite frame property. Suppose the set
of nite frames F corresponding to  is decidable. We can easily nd an elemen-
tary enumeration ('k)k2! of all -underivable formulas, such that we can nd a
counter-model Kk with frame in F of 'k in an elementary way from k. In our main
theorem, we have shown that we can transform Kk in an elementary way into a
0
2-substitution k such that HA() 0 k('k).
Theorem 6.2. Under the circumstances described above, we have the uniform de
Jongh property for HA() with respect to .
Proof. Let Ai := i('i). Applying theorem 6.1, with HA() in the role of T, we
nd R(x) with the promised properties. Take (p) := 9y (R(y) ^ true0
2(py(p)q)).
Here true0
2 is the 0
2-truth predicate and py(p)q is a arithmetization that sends
y to the G odel number of y(p).
Suppose HA() ` ('j). It follows that HA() ` R(j) ! j('j), contradicting
the assumption. 2
7. Cautionary Afterword
We have proved our results with pleasant, pedestrian methods. The reason for
this luxurious situation is the simplicity and power of the two basic ideas on which
everything rests: Smory nski's idea of the preservation of HA under adding ! as a
root and Smory nski's extension of the idea to non-standard models, provided that
the rest of the Kripke model is denable in the new root. These ideas allow us to
construct Kripke models step-by-step with a lot of control over their properties.
However, as Johan Cruij said elk voordeel heb z'n nadeel, i.e., every advantage
comes with a disadvantage. The disadvantage is that the essential dependence on
these ideas makes the results not easily extendible.
A rst possible direction of extension would be more frame classes. We note that
there is not much hope to extend our results to frame classes with innite models
|at least not with the methods at hand. The reason is that the preservation of HA
under adding a suitable root is essentially a tool for constructing nite objects. OfINTERMEDIATE LOGICS AND THE DE JONGH PROPERTY 15
course, we may extend the construction to non-standardly nite models, but these
are rather articial from the point of view of frame classes of intermediate logics.
The good news here is that almost all known natural logics do have the nite frame
property. A possible exception is the Propositional Logic of Realizability. In this
connection it is worth pointing out that de Jongh's original proof could handle
innite frames but that it did need trees.
The second possible extension would be more arithmetical theories. There seems
to be no hope to extend our results to extensions of HA that lack the Smory nski
property. For example, we do know that HA + ECT0 has the de Jongh property of
IPC, but the extension of HA + ECT0 with intermediate logics is a complete terra
incognita. In this case it could be interesting to look for counterexamples to the
extension of our results.
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